Missouri Law Review
Volume 26
Issue 4 November 1961

Article 11

1961

Book Reviews

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Book Reviews , 26 MO. L. REV. (1961)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol26/iss4/11

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School
of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

et al.: Book Reviews

Book Reviews
THE QUEST FOR EgUAITY: THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS AM THE SUPREME COURT.

By Robert J. Harris. Baton Rouge: 'Louisiana State University Press, 1960, Pp.

xiv, 172. $4.00
Jack Greenberg. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1959. Pp. viii, 481. $10.00

RAcE RELATioNs AND AMERICAN LAW. By

These two books complement each other very nicely. While they are both
concerned with the "equal protection of the laws" in the realm of race relations,
one deals primarily with the theoretical and constitutional origins, congressional

background, and judicial application of that clause of the fourteenth amendment,
while the other describes the legal doctrines of today that govern race relations
in the United States along with the degree of success or failure of those doctrines.
Robert J. Harris, professor of political science at Vanderbilt University, has long
been a careful student of American constitutional law. The material in his book,

The Quest for Equdity, was originally delivered as the 1959 Edward Douglass
White lectures at 'Louisiana State University. In this study he attempts to relate
the origins of "the equal protection of the laws" in political theory and the landmarks of Anglo-American constitutionalism to their legislative history in Congress
and to examine the manner in which the United States Supreme Court has judicially construed that clause in cases coming before it.
An analysis of the major landmarks in ancient and medieval political theory
which provides an historical basis for the American tradition of equality leads
Professor Harris to conclude that there are two ideas implicit and explicit in the

"equal protection" clause of the fourteenth amendment: first, the duty of government to protect all persons in their civil rights and, second, the equality of all persons before the law. From an examination of the congressional debates from 1886
through 1875, which concerned the proposal of the fourteenth amendment and
subsequent efforts to implement its provisions by statute, he is convinced that
the framers of the fourteenth amendment intended Congress to have positive
power to assure the realization of this dual concept of equality.
Judicial interpretation of the fourteenth amendment in the pre-1900 cases
had the effect of making the Supreme Court, and not Congress, the major organ
for its enforcement, contrary to the expectation of its framers. Professor Harris'
displeasure with Mr. Justice Brown's opinion in Ple.rsy v. Ferguson- is quite evident
1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
(519)
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from his characterization of it as "a compound of bad logic, bad history, bad
sociology, and bad constitutional law,'" 2 whereas he characterizes Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent as "sound logic, accurate history . . correct constitutional law, and
...

high moral assumptions and aspirations." 3

"The Judicial Burial of Jim Crow" (the title of the concluding chapter) began
around 1935 when the Court subjected to careful scrutiny instances of racial
discrimination in the selection of trial and grand juries. These were followed by
decisions dealing with restrictive convenants, suffrage, higher education; and "the
burial" was finally realized with the decision in the school segregation cases and
its extension to other public facilities and accommodations. Although praising
the decision in Brown v. Board of Education,4 Professor Harris shows keen disappointment in the opinion by Chief Justice Warren asserting that it lacked the
"vigor and conviction of the dissents of the earlier Justice Harlan in other cases
dealing with segregation, and it fell short of the legal craftsmanship of more recent
opinions by Chief Justice Hughes, Justice Cardozo, and Justice Stone, which
'
changed the course of the law by reversing earlier decisions."1
The Quest for Equality is a powerfully persuasive analysis of a subject of
compelling interest to students of American constitutional law, and the more
persuasive because it is the work of a native southerner.
Race Rehltions and American Law might well be characterized as a single

volume treatise (in the legal bibliographic sense) on the law of race relations
in the United States. It is a wide ranging and encyclopedic study by one who
has been intimately involved with the subject. Jack Greenberg is the recently
appointed general counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and appeared before
the United States Supreme Court in the school segregation cases.
The book is so arranged that it has great utility as a reference tool. The
first two chapters deal with legal problems which are common to all phases of
race relations. Each of the remaining nine chapters is devoted to a particular
phase of race relations: "Public Accommodations and Services," "Interstate Travel,"
"Elections," "Earning a Living," "Education," "Housing and Real Property," "The
Criminal Law," "Domestic Relations Law," and "The Armed Forces." A lengthy
section of appendixes (some eighty pages) makes readily available much useful
information, particularly citations to state statutes and constitutional provisions
relative to race relations.
In addition to providing a valuable reference tool in the law of race relations
in the United States, Mr. Greenberg attempts to give the subject matter a unifying
theme by posing the following questions: "Can the law alter race relations?
Can it create or end discrimination and prejudice? Have the thousands of laws

8
and law suits . . . been able to cause or prevent social change?" He answers

2. P. 101.
3. P. 102.
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. Pp. 149-150.
6. P. 2.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol26/iss4/11
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these questions in the affirmative, stating in "The Prospect," (a one page conclusion) :
Law has demonstrated its capacity to change race relations, and in
the future this ability will grow. A legal rule might falter or rebound
if it ran counter to the other forces of life; the inherent frailties of legal
procedure might stultify efforts to use law for social change in other
circumstances; but in the nation and the world in which we live the
application of legal rules governing race relations is bound to continue
7
to bring social practices into line with the legal norm.
Thus the author would disagree with the thesis of sociologist William Graham
Sumner that "stateways cannot change folkways."
In attempting to discuss comprehensively in a single volume such a large
and important subject as Race Relations and American Law, Mr. Greenberg has
been singularly successful.
FREDERICK C. SPIEGEL*

THE UNITED STATES (2d edition) Two volumes.
By Thomas I. Emerson and David Haber. Buffalo, N. Y.: Dennis and Co.,
1958. Pp. xvii, 757 and vi, 777. $36.00

POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN

BILL OF RIGHTS READER (2d edition). By Milton R. Konvitz. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1960. Pp. xx, 849. $8.25
These publications do not readily lend themselves to review for two reasons:
first, both are in their second edition and are well established works, quite
thoroughly reviewed in their earlier versions; and second, the content of these
volumes consists of selections of cases and materials in the field of civil rights
which are not ideal subjects for review. However, a few comments describing
certain features of the revised editions with some evaluation as to their utility
may 'be in order.
The two volume work by Professors Emerson and Haber, law teachers at
Yale and Rutgers respectively, have provided us with the most comprehensive
collection of legal materials in the field of 'political and civil 'rights. With the
multitude of -books being written in the field of civil liberties, nothing as yet can be
classified as an overall legal treatise on the subject. This work comes the closest
to filling that bill.
The materials are grouped under seven chapter headings which are as follows:
"The Right to Security of Person," which is a somewhat deceiving chapter title
since it actually deals with the federal enforcement of civil rights; "The Right
of Franchisb;" "Right of Political Organizations and Political Expression," a lengthy

7. P. 371.
* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri.
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chapter of 503 pages constituting the major part of the first volume; "Other
Problems of Freedom of Speech;" "Academic Freedom;" "Freedom of Religion"
and "Discrimination." For each of these topics the authors provide generous
portions of the opinions (including concurrences and dissents) of pertinent cases
and lengthy excerpts from significant articles, books, classic works, documents and
statutes. The authors include helpful introductory and transitional commentary
relating the various subtopics in each chapter. The extensive notes and bibliographic references are outstanding and will prove invaluable to the student of
civil liberties. The materials provided in chapter one, dealing with the federal
enforcement of civil liberties, is as good a documentary source on this topic as
is available anywhere.
Those familiar with the first edition will be disappointed with the revised
edition in two respects. First, a large and important area of civil liberties has
been omitted, that being the rights of individuals in criminal proceedings, a subject
included in the earlier edition under the heading "Fairness in Governmental
Procedures." The authors refer to this as "our most painful omission" and justify
the deletion by stating that "the material is treated in courses and texts on
criminal law."I To the many nonlawyers who have not had the benefit of such
courses the utility of this work is definitely lessened.
A second disappointing feature can be attributed to the publisher. Eight
years ago this reviewer, as a graduate student, took a course on the Constitution
and civil liberties, the textbook used being the first edition of this work by Emerson
and Haber. It was a single volume publication, priced at seven dollars and fifty
cents, and was ideally suited as a text for the course. A few years later, this reviewer, upon entering the ranks of the college teaching profession, instituted such
a course eagerly anticipating the use of an updated edition of that text. However,
this revision has been made available only in a two volume edition consisting of
over 1500 pages and priced at thirty-six dollars. The publisher might well consider
making subsequent editions available in both the reference edition as it now appears
and in an abridged single volume text edition.
In spite of these criticisms, this publication is an outstanding contribution
to the literature of political and civil liberties in the United States and should
have wide use.
The Bill of Rights Reader is a collection of cases designed for the general
reader who is interested in civil rights. Its author, Milton R. Konvitz, professor
of industrial and labor relations and professor of law at Cornell University, has
been one of the country's most prolific writers in the field of civil liberties, having
authored or edited more than ten books on this general subject.
The term "Bill of Rights" as incorporated in the book's title is a convenient
phrase which the author uses to include not only the first eight amendments,
but also the Civil War Amendments and some of the provisions of the original
Constitution, like those prohibiting bills of attainder and test oaths-in brief,
1. P. xv.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol26/iss4/11
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all provisions incorporating civil and political liberties wherever they may appear
in the Constitution.
The book contains nearly one hundred cases with helpful introductory notes
which provide the necessary background to the particular case. Professor Konvitz
had the good judgment to let the Justices speak for themselves with generous
excerpts from their opinions. He includes a few cases from courts other than the
United States Supreme Court where the opinion might enlighten the reader with
respect to a particular phase of the subject not yet dealt with by the Court.
This book puts the reader in touch with many of the notable decisions and opinions
of the "Warren Court," in the realm of civil liberties.
One misses some of the classic opinions of yesteryear authored by Justices
Holmes, Brandeis, and Harlan I. No doubt space limitations dictated such omissions
since the author's primary objective was to provide us with as many of the recent
decisions as possible. Absolutely no reference is made to the cases and statutes
dealing with the federal protection of civil rights, a very important phase of
current civil liberties activity. To those who use this volume as a textbook in
civil liberties courses (as the reviewer does), this omission definitely reduces the
utility of the publication.
The author's stated objective in preparing this collection of cases is to make
"a contribution to the education of that mythical character, the average educated
2
American who is interested in the great issues and the great debates of his day."
For the persons who read this book this objective will be realized.
FREDmtICic C. SPIEGEL*

LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN
HISTORY. By Leonard W. Levy. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1960. Pp. xiv, 353. $6.50
THE FIRST AND THE FIFTH: WITH SOME EXCURSIONS INTO OrHERS. By 0. John
Rogge. New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1960. Pp. ix, 358. $8.50
Both of these books deal with that freedom which Mr. Justice Cardozo referred to as "the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of
freedom,"1 namely, freedom of expression, for only through the free and uncensored
expression of opinion can government be kept responsive to the electorate and
can governmental power be transferred peacefully. Both books have this feature
in common, that the authors, to varying degrees, deal with the historical background and development of this fundamental freedom.

2. P. viii.
* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri
1. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
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Professor Levy of Brandeis University, well known for his fine study of Chief
Justice Lemuel Shaw, 2 presents a revisionist interpretation of the background and
original meaning of the first amendment's clause on freedom of speech and press.
As he states in the preface: "I have been reluctantly forced to conclude that the
generation which adopted the Constitution and the Bill of Rights did not believe
in a broad scope for freedom of expression, particularly in the realm of politics."3
This conclusion, based on intensive research in primary sources (the study is
well documented), will prove to be a dissappointment to those civil libertarians
who marshal support for their position on freedom of expression from "the intention of the framers" as reflected from a literal interpretation of the first amendment.
It has been accepted in both law and history that those responsible for the first
amendment had a very broad understanding of freedom of speech and press and
intended to abolish the common law of seditious libel. Mr. Justice Holmes, for
example, with Mr. Justice Brandeis concurring, declared: "I wholly disagree with
the argument . ..that the first amendment left the common law as to seditious
libel in force. History seems to me against the notion. ' ' 4 In his classic work on
the subject, Zechariah Chafee alleged, "The first amendment was written by men
w
intended to wipe out the common law of sedition, and make further
. .who
prosecutions for criticism of the government, without any incitement to law breaking, forever impossible in the United States of America." 5 More recently Justices
Black and Douglas stated, "But the first amendment repudiated seditious libel
for this country." Numerous other writers have supported the same proposition.
According to Levy: "The evidence suggests that the proposition is more presuppositious than plausible, or if plausible, unprovable."
Impressive evidence is presented supporting the thesis that from the time
of Milton to the adoption of the first amendment the libertarian theory accepted
the right of the state to suppress seditious libel. Colonial America was not hospitable
to advocates of odious or unorthodox ideas. Even the celebrated Zenger case produced no broad concept of freedom of expression. Speech and press were not free
anywhere during the American Revolution and there was little change upon its
successful completion. While some of our -best constitutional authorities have
argued that one object of the Revolution was to get rid of the English common
law with respect to the freedom of speech and press, Levy asserts that: "It is
closer to the truth to say that the Revolution almost got rid of freedom of speech
and press, instead of the common law on the subject." s The Blackstonian definition
of liberty of speech and press was provided by constitution or by statute in
twelve States, including nine which guaranteed a free press.
Professor Levy's study further reveals that the history of the drafting and
2. LEvY,

THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW

(1957).

3. P. vii.
4. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).

5.

CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES

21 (1948).

6. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 272 (1951).
7. P. 3.
8. P. 182.
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adoption of the first amendment's freedom of speech and press clause does not
suggest and intend to institute broad reform. If the purpose of the first amendment was to eradicate the common law meaning of seditious libel both the framers
of the amendment and those who ratified it might have been more explicit in
stating it both in the Congress and in the debates during ratification. A spirit of
tentativeness is evident in Levy's study at this point, largely due to the meagerness
of the sources during the period from 1787 to 1791. He admits that:
We do not know what the first amendment's freedom of speech and
press clause meant to the men who drafted and ratified it at the time
that they did so. Moreover, they themselves were at that time sharply
divided and possessed no clear understanding either. If, however, a choice
must be made between two propositions, first, that the clause substantially embodied the Blackstonian definition and left the law of seditious libel in force, or second, that it repudiated Blackstone and superseded
the common law, the known evidence points strongly in support of the
former proposition.9
He concludes that a broad libertarian theory of freedom of expression did not
emerge in the United States until the Jeffersonian Party was threatened by the
Sedition Act of 1798.
While Legacy of Suppression casts great doubt upon the authority of the
past's original intentions as support for present preferences, Levy does assure his
readers that the cause for freedom of expression is not lost for "the case for civil
liberties is so powerfully grounded in political philosophy's wisest principles, as
well as the wisest policies drawn from experience, that it need not be anchored
to the past."10 This most interesting and scholarly study will prove to be a major
contribution to American constitutional history.
The First and the Fifth likewise deals with freedom of expression, "the first"
protecting freedom of utterance and "the fifth," the right to silence. Author 0.
John Rogge, formerly Assistant United States Attorney General (Criminal Division) and long concerned with providing full protection to persons in the exercise
of their civil liberties, dedicates the book to the United States Supreme Court and
presents an historical justification of the absolute position of freedom of expression.
Mr. Rogge's analysis of the historical background of the first amendment runs
counter to that of Professor Levy, arguing that the amendment constitutes an
absolute proscription upon Congress from abridging freedom of expression. He
draws most of his support from writings which come after the passage of the Sedition Act of 1798 and, according to Levy's study, of which Mr. Rogge did not have
the benefit, it is doubtful whether these writings represent the feelings of the
framers at the time of the adoption of the first amendment.
While maintaining that there exists no federal power to restrict speech, the
author rejects the "incorporation theory" of Mr. Justice Black that the due

9. Pp. 247-48.
10. P. 4.
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process clause of the fourteenth amendment incorporates the first amendment,
thus proscribing the states from interfering with any of the rights guaranteed
therein. He argues that the due process clause "supplies no basis for that theory
historically and an erroneous one judicially."' 1 He asserts that the States ought
to have leeway under the due process clause to deal with necessary restrictions
on speech and problems of sedition but "the leeway which the states will have
will be small.1' 12 This would appear to make Mr. Rogge an absolutist with respect
to the power of the federal government to interfere with speech -but a relativist
with respect to state power in that area. Mr. Rogge provides an extended discussion of some of the classic civil liberties cases through the 1958 term of the
Supreme Court.
The author's discussion of the "right of silence" turns on the fifth amendments
prohibition against compulsory testimony on the part of a defendant. Two long
chapters, totaling 140 pages, provide the reader with a very interesting historical
analysis of this most important guarantee and of compulsory testimony acts. Mr.
Rogge has long been interested in confessions by defendants, compulsory as well as
noncompulsory, as demonstrated by his earlier book, Why Men Confess. His treatment of the right to silence might have been more complete had he included some
discussion of the concept of this right under the first amendment as set forth by
Chief Justice Warren in the Watkins48 case and Mr. Justice Black in his dissent in
14
the Barenblatt case.
The "excursions" are very brief discussions of such related matters as freedom
of privacy, political activity, movement, and knowledge; the rights of confrontation and jury trials in contempt cases; use of mails; and peaceful picketing, all
treated in the last chapter.
While The First and the Fifth does not make as great a contribution to
scholarship as that of Professor Levy, anyone interested in the study of civil
liberties will find much of value in very readable form.
FREDERICK C. SPIEGEL*

11. P. 53.
12. P. 102.
13. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
14. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1961).
*Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri.
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